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Abstract—Achieving security and privacy in the cloud is not a
trivial exercise. Indeed, the difficulties associated with achieving
this goal are both many and highly complex, and present one
of the major barriers to the uptake of cloud computing. Yet,
we know cloud computing offers the possibility of substantial
economic benefit to firms, as well as providing great agility,
which can offer a competitive advantage in today’s difficult
trading conditions. We address this issue by considering whether
greater accountability, and particularly a broadening of the scope
of Service Level Agreements, can enhance cloud security and
privacy.
Index Terms—security; privacy; standards; compliance; assur-
ance; audit; service level agreements; cloud service providers;
responsibility; accountability; agency theory; stewardship theory
I. INTRODUCTION
What do we mean by cloud security and privacy? A
fundamental requirement of achieving privacy is to first have
a proper level of security. Without security, there can be no
privacy. Thus we must first consider the issues of achiev-
ing proper security. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
[1] has two useful definitions of security “The safety of
an organization, establishment, or building from espionage,
criminal activity, illegal entrance or escape, etc.” and “With
reference to cyber-security: the state of being protected against
the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the
measures to achieve this.” Privacy, OED: “absence or avoid-
ance of publicity or display; secrecy, concealment, discretion;
protection from public knowledge or availability”, is clearly
linked to security. It is, however, difficult for a company
to know if it is secure, especially as this is likely to be
a moving target over time and be affected by changes in
internal processes or the outside environment. The company’s
management can seek to assure itself of security through
assurance, OED: “A promise or engagement making a thing
certain; a formal engagement, pledge, or guarantee; a positive
declaration intended to give confidence”, through employing
individual or corporate experts to interrogate the company’s
processes and internal activities. A key part of this assurance
could come from trust in a broad written agreement between
provider and user (usually referred to as the “Service Level
Agreement” in a cloud context) that was open to regular and
thorough inspection and verification. In this paper we contend
that “SLA’s” are too narrow in scope and too one-sided in
nature for such user confidence to be established.
This evidence can take two forms: compliance or audit.
Compliance, OED: “The action or fact of complying with a
wish or command”, requires a code or set of standards against
which the company’s activities and processes can be compared
and either match (compliant) or fall short (non-compliant).
The evidence of security that a compliance check list provides
depends on a number of factors including the knowledge and
independence of those who wrote the code and whether it is
still pertinent to today’s environment.
Audit, OED: “To make an official systematic examination
of (accounts), so as to ascertain their accuracy”, requires
outsiders who are deemed to be both objective and expert to
form their own opinion of what is being examined and then to
publicly state their confidence (or otherwise) in the reliability
of what they have investigated. Auditing is not straightforward
or easy. Just as with accounting auditors, objectivity is difficult
when companies pay auditors who would like to be retained
for the following year. Audit is also potentially very expensive
if done well by the best experts in the field and there is a
temptation to reduce the experts’ role to one of advising, often
writing checklists to be administered by qualified technicians.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section II we discuss the challenges of cloud security and
privacy, including the definition of a set of security goals, com-
pliance with cloud security standards, audit issues, the impact
of management approaches on security, and how complexity
and the lack of responsibility and accountability affects cloud
security; In Section III we investigate why these challenges are
difficult to address; In Section IV we address the remaining
key issue to be tackled; and in Section V our conclusions.
II. THE CHALLENGES
There are a number of challenges which need to be ad-
dressed in order to achieve the goal of good security. The
fundamental concepts of information security are confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), a concept developed
when it was common practice for corporate management to
run a company under agency theory. Agency theory can be
used to describe a contract under which the principal engages
an agent to perform some service on their behalf which in-
volves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.
Shareholders (principal) and chief executive officer (agent)
is one such relationship. While both principal and agent are
utility maximisers, they would not necessarily always have the
same alignment of goals. We have all seen how the excesses
of corporate greed have failed to be curtailed by agency
theory. The same is true for cloud security, which would
suggest a different approach is needed. The rest of the paper
addresses the following important points in turn: Definition
of security goals; Compliance with standards; Audit issues;
Management approach; Complexity; Lack of responsibility
and accountability.
A. Definition of Security Goals
The business environment is constantly changing, as are
corporate governance rules, with more emphasis now being
placed on responsibility and accountability [2], social con-
science [3], sustainability [4][5], resilience [6] and ethics [7].
Responsibility and accountability are, in effect, mechanisms
we can use to help achieve all the other security goals. Since
social conscience and ethics are very closely related, the
traditional CIA triad can be expanded to include sustainability,
resilience and ethics.
In this enhanced security requirements framework, we note
definitions of the added factors: Sustainability, OED: “the
quality of being sustainable at a certain rate or level”. Re-
silience, OED: “the quality or fact of being able to recover
quickly or easily from, or resist being affected by, a mis-
fortune, shock, illness, etc.; robustness; adaptability”. Ethics,
OED: “the codes of conduct or moral principles recognized
in a particular profession, sphere of activity, relationship, or
other context or aspect of human life”. We include social
responsibility under this heading which can be defined as “the
practice of producing goods and services in a way that is not
harmful to society or the environment”.
B. Compliance with Standards
Looking at how we achieve these goals in practice, we have
identified the use of assurance to achieve security through
compliance and audit. Turning first to compliance, there are a
number of challenges to address. Since the evolution of cloud
computing, there are a number of cloud security standards
which have evolved, but the problem is that there is still
no standard which offers a comprehensive level of complete
security — there is no “one size covers all”, which is a limi-
tation. Even compliance with all standards will not guarantee
complete security, which, presents another disadvantage [8].
While standards compliance is often perceived as a laudable
aim, the flaw where new computing technology is concerned
is that the pace of evolution of new technology far outstrips
the capability of international standards organisations to keep
up with the changes [9]. This slow pace of evolution of
cloud security standards presents a major flaw in a rapidly
evolving technological and threat landscape, with the potential
to cause immeasurable harm to companies. A further flaw with
compliance mechanisms used in cloud security standards is the
manner in which checklists are used [10]. Compliance with
security standards can be viewed as an agency reaction by
company management to protect them from being sued by
their own principals for failing to implement proper security.
Since current standards are neither complete, nor up to date,
compliance with these standards cannot ensure security [8].
Compliance audit frequency is generally quite relaxed.
Reassessment need take place only when system changes take
place, or every few years, otherwise. This completely fails to
grasp the rapidly evolving nature of security threats. There
exists a clear need to employ some method of continuous
monitoring when it comes to security management. Reports
from global security companies [11]–[13] suggest that over
85% of security breaches involve a low level of technical
competence, facilitated instead by lack of understanding, lack
of competence, or poor configuration of victims’ systems.
C. Audit Issues
Auditing in the accountancy world has enjoyed the benefit
of over a century of practice and experience, yet there remain
differences of opinion with a number of problems yet to be re-
solved. Duncan and Whittington [8] provide some background
on this issue. Cloud computing audit is not a mature field,
and there will be some way to go before it can catch up
with work done in the accounting profession. An obvious area
of weakness arises when taking audit professionals from the
accounting world out of their comfort zone, and placing them
in a more technical field. Equally, the use of people with a
computing background can overcome some of these issues,
but their lack of audit background presents another weakness.
Gray et al [14] address corporate social reporting consider-
ing the concepts of accountability and the social contract.
Gray [15] considers accounting’s potential for contribution
to accountability and transparency in participative democracy,
the potential for non-financial accounts of the biosphere and,
perhaps most contentiously, the use of current accounting
techniques for the operationalisation of an accounting for
sustainability. Dhillon and Backhouse [16] suggest that in
addition to traditional CIA security concerns, organisations
must consider that responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality
principles hold the key for successfully managing information
security.
Gray [17], considers the previous 30 years of social ac-
counting, reporting and auditing, and proposes that this is
the function of accountability — to require individuals and
organisations to present an account of those actions for which
society holds them — or would wish to hold them —
responsible. Owen et al [18] suggest that despite seemingly
endorsing active stakeholder engagement, current social and
ethical accounting, auditing and reporting practice amounts to
little more than corporate spin. Alles et al [19] consider the
feasibility and economics of continuous assurance. Cohen et
al [20] recognise the importance of corporate governance in
ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. They
found that auditors view management as the primary driver of
corporate governance.
Ramamoorti [21] considers the establishment, growth, and
evolution of the contemporary internal auditing profession.
Adams and Evans [22] address concerns in achieving greater
accountability in social reports. Moeller [23] considers how
the role of internal audit has changed since the introduction
of SOX in 2002. Zeff [24] examines the historical evolution
in the US of the use of the term “present fairly” in the
auditor’s report. Archambeault et al [25] consider the need
for an IAR to increase governance transparency for external
stakeholders, to complement existing governance disclosures,
increase stakeholder confidence in governance quality, and
motivate internal audit diligence, while recognising that further
research is needed.
Cloud audit research has been limited due to a combination
of the lack of maturity in the field and the greater technical
complexities posed. Bernstein et al [26] in their proposed
framework for promoting trust in the use of cloud systems
identified the need to ensure a proper audit trail is maintained.
Leavitt [27] warns that companies will be unable to pass
audit by their customers if they are unable to demonstrate
an adequate level of control over cloud data. Chen et al [28]
propose the novel concept of mutual audit as a means of
improving trust between parties. Pearson and Benameur [29]
consider the use of tracing audit authorities to enhance privacy,
security and trust. Zhou et al [30] propose an extra audit layer
to be run on the cloud to “watch over” what goes on in the
cloud.
Ramgovind et al [31] note that reluctance of cloud vendors
to allow audit, or to undergo standards compliance presents a
barrier to use. IsecT [32] present a superficial introduction to
information security frameworks, covering security standards,
laws, regulations and security recommendations or obligations
of various kinds. Hoyer et al [33] suggest a generic archi-
tectural model to unify the classic fraud audit approach with
human behaviour in order to achieve better fraud detection and
prevention. Ko et al [34] note that despite audit-ability being
one the key components of trust, most of the cloud service
providers (CSP) are failing to address the issue, while noting
the difficulties present in achieving such a goal. Brucker et al
[35] present a tool chain to support both design-time modelling
as well as run-time enforcement of security requirements for
business process-driven systems. Stahl et al [36] carry out a
critical evaluation of information security policies in the UK
healthcare sector.
De Haes et al [37] suggest COBIT could make a good
framework for the enterprise governance of IT. Mulig et al
[38] note that in many companies, accounting departments
deal with downloaded data that is analysed using worksheet
software, which can bypass normal IT controls. Herath and
Herath [39], addressing compliance with ever-increasing pri-
vacy laws, accounting and banking regulations, and standards,
suggest this is top priority for most organisations, but express
concern that, unlike financial reporting, information security
and systems audits are not mandatory.
D. Management Approach
CSPs have developed their cloud business models using
agency theory. Pallas et al [40] suggest that agency theory
models the current relationship between CSPs and cloud users
very well, further suggesting this expresses all the weaknesses
of agency and highlights many of the issues still faced today.
Given the potential multiplicity of actors, and the complexities
of their relationships with each other in cloud ecosystems, it is
clear that simple traditional agency relationships (where each
actor looks to their own short term ends) will no longer be
able to handle fully the security implications for users of these
ecosystems. There is a clear need for developing a stronger
mechanism to ensure users of such ecosystems can be assured
of the security of their information. The question is, how does
management approach impact on cloud security?
Standard service level agreement (SLA) offerings from the
major players basically ignore accountability, assurance, audit,
confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy, responsibility
and security, merely offering availability as the focus of their
measure of performance. The onus for measuring and proving
unacceptable performance is neatly passed to the customer,
which, with the inclusion of some suitably deeply buried
clauses in the small print, assures the buck invariably never
stops with the CSP. Of course it is possible to negotiate an SLA
to include these missing measures, but one would anticipate
that the arrangement costs and increased service costs would
significantly reduce or even eliminate any potential cost sav-
ings offered by the cloud paradigm. Since such costs would,
in any event, only be affordable by the largest corporations,
this puts most small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and
sole traders at a commercial disadvantage.
This is clearly worrying in today’s climate of increasing
punitive regulatory fines for privacy and security breaches
and the potential negative impact on business costs and the
knock-on negative impact on share values. Taken against a
backdrop of an ever expanding threat environment, it is clear
that positive action is needed globally.
E. Complexity
Another issue is the increasing complexity which new
technology brings, and the ever increasing potential exposure
to risk brought about by a failure to grasp the significance of
risks arising as a result of this increase in complexity [41]. Tra-
ditional distributed information systems present a multiplicity
of technical layers, each of which must interact with one or
more other layers. Rather than simplifying this process, cloud
introduces yet more layers. There is Infrastructure, Platform
and Software as a Service (IaaS, Paas and SaaS), each of which
can be operated by different actors. Cloud brokers may also
be involved, leading to yet more layers, yet more complexity,
yet more risk. Thus, there is a need for a more agile, effec-
tive, approach to address these issues. Another hurdle to be
overcome is the cross disciplinary nature of today’s corporate
world, with more cross-over between disciplines than in the
past, which means no single discipline can effectively deal
with all the issues arising from the use of cloud technology
[42]. Existing security paradigms have not kept pace with the
rapidity of development, change and complexity in modern
information ecosystems. There is a danger that continued
reliance on existing models will lead to real weaknesses in
systems which can be vulnerable to exploitation. The challenge
here is to develop a means of addressing these weaknesses at a
conceptual level which can be demonstrably more robust than
existing mechanisms currently in place. We aim to address this
challenge in our future work.
F. Lack of Responsibility and Accountability
We must also consider the role that responsibility and
accountability play in achieving this difficult objective. Re-
sponsibility, OED:“a moral obligation to behave correctly
towards or in respect of a person or thing”, Accountability,
OED: “the quality of being accountable; liability to account for
and answer for one’s conduct, performance of duties, etc. (in
modern use often with regard to parliamentary, corporate, or
financial liability to the public, shareholders, etc.)”. Monahan
and Yearworth [43] observe that SLAs should be meaningful,
both for customers and vendors as defined by some objective
criteria, but evidence from procurement failures for large IT
systems suggests otherwise. This observation has inspired
an investigation into the possibility of offering alternative
security SLAs that would be meaningful to both customers
and vendors. Yao et al [44] consider the implementation of
an Accountability as a Service approach using continuous
cloud monitoring and audit to ensure better quality of service.
Haeberlen et al [45] propose that cloud services should be
mutually accountable to both CSP and customer, to ensure a
proper level of service can be achieved, however did accept
that some challenges remain to be overcome.
The Cloud Accountability Project (A4Cloud) focuses on:
“The Accountability For Cloud and Other Future Internet
Services as the most critical prerequisite for effective gover-
nance and control of corporate and private data processed by
cloud-based IT services”. Pearson et al [46] write about the
A4Cloud project which has as its main focus accountability.
By combining methods of risk analysis, policy enforcement,
monitoring and compliance auditing with tailored IT mech-
anisms for security, assurance and redress, A4Cloud aims to
extend accountability across entire cloud service value chains,
covering personal and business sensitive information in the
cloud. Catteddu et al [47] present a model of accountability
for cloud computing services, based on ongoing work as
part of the A4Cloud project. Theoharidou et al [48] exam-
ine privacy risk assessment for cloud, and identify threats,
vulnerabilities and countermeasures that clients and providers
should implement in order to achieve privacy compliance and
accountability.
Hon et al [49] consider the implications for cloud ac-
countability of current proposals under the draft General Data
Protection Regulation to modernise the EU Data Protection
Directive. Bernsmed et al [50] identify and explore a number
of accountability obligations that arise in the context of
medical sensor networks in the cloud, including accountability
obligations from a European perspective. Ko [51] reviews
the definitions, existing techniques and standards in the area
of data accountability in cloud computing. Benghabrit et al
[52] propose a framework for the representation of cloud
accountability policies. Tountopoulis et al [53] elaborate on
the general aspects of an accountability-based approach to
IT and data governance, which can facilitate organisations
dealing with the cloud to comply with applicable legislation
and provide more evidence that confidential and/or personal
data are handled in accordance with relevant data protection
legislation. Papanikolaou et al [54] present an implemented
system to model and visually represent the functioning of ac-
countability mechanisms for cloud computing (such as policy
enforcement, monitoring, intrusion detection, logging, redress
and re-mediation mechanisms) over provider boundaries along
the supply chain of service providers.
It is clear that the rapid evolution of the cloud computing
paradigm has been facilitated by the agency approach of all
the CSPs. While this has resulted in a rapid and successful
implementation of a highly attractive new paradigm, it has
also glossed over a myriad issues relating to proper security
and privacy, concerns which are justifiably gaining far more
traction in today’s highly dangerous security environment.
III. WHY THESE CHALLENGES ARE DIFFICULT TO
ADDRESS
The fundamental security concepts of CIA are no longer
enough to cope with today’s corporate responsibilities. In an
environment where corporate governance extends far beyond
these basic requirements, more is needed. With Pym, we have
suggested [55] that the traditional CIA approach be expanded
to cover sustainability, resilience and ethics, in order to more
properly reflect today’s changed corporate governance envi-
ronment. We have warned of the dangers surrounding com-
pliance with standards [8], and the mechanisms deployed for
compliance [10]. We suggest that compliance with standards,
in a world where security goals are a constantly moving target,
where standards are incomplete, out of date, not fully relevant
or otherwise inappropriate, will not be a trivial exercise.
The challenge of dealing with audit remains complex, and
all the more difficult where CSPs are neither willing to allow
proper audit trail recording to be carried out, nor to allow
third parties to audit their systems. We suggest that this
issue will become much easier to address if the issue of
responsibility and accountability is first resolved. This is an
area for further research. The existing agency theory-based
management approach presents a serious challenge in the
complex ecosystem of the cloud. The unwillingness of CSPs
to accept responsibility for their part in ensuring a proper
level of cloud security and privacy is a critical issue. We have
proposed [56] that a move away from agency theory towards
stewardship theory may go some way towards helping rectify
this situation. Under stewardship theory, the behaviour of a
steward is collective. This behaviour is closely aligned with
the success of the organisation.
Companies are quite properly legally held responsible and
accountable to a variety of regulators throughout industry un-
der privacy and security regulations. Fines for non-compliance
are reaching punitive levels, and many regulators have extreme
levels of sanction at their disposal. Yet, where such companies
use cloud, the CSPs are not held to account for their role in
such failures! Little wonder there is so much resistance to
the adoption of this resource over fears of poor security and
privacy. Cloud security standards organisations have tried for
years to encourage CSPs to help lead development of proper
cloud security standards by taking an active role in the process,
and to accept responsibility for their part in achieving this goal.
So far, they have been met with a resounding silence. However,
this may be changing. In 2012, the European Commission
(EC) published a cloud computing strategy [57], which out-
lines three objectives to encourage the use of cloud services,
including the development of standard contractual terms for
SLAs. The Commission published guidelines [58] developed
by a sub-group of the Cloud Select Industry Group (CSIG)
composed of representatives from expert groups such as the
EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)
and industry majors such as Amazon, Google, IBM, Microsoft,
SAP and Salesforce, addressing areas of performance, security,
data management and data protection.
While this impressive range of effort is welcomed, there
are some issues. First, the guidelines are voluntary, rather than
mandatory, which presents a fundamental flaw. Second, such
guidelines would need to be developed at an international level
to ensure effective enforcement across multiple jurisdictions.
Third, some aspects of the guidelines are vague, and of course,
they have yet to be trialed.
IV. CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDER OR PARTNER?
Given the nature of the rapidly evolving threat environment,
and society’s dependence on information systems, we suggest
the time for serious action is already overdue, particularly on
security and privacy. Cloud computing has the potential to
become a fabulous resource for society as a whole, alongside
business and government. Taking a fully accountable and
ethical view of their responsibilities would assist CSPs to sub-
stantially open up the market for cloud computing and would
improve their standing in the global community. CSPs need to
provide a standard SLA that covers not only availability to the
level they currently offer, but need to properly address issues
of accountability, assurance, audit, confidentiality, compliance,
integrity, privacy, responsibility and security.
Many of these issues can be more readily addressed using
technical solutions, which would be relatively simple for CSPs
to introduce. But, before this is possible, there is a need
to accept responsibility for the service they offer, become
accountable for their actions, or inactions, and to behave
in a more complete, ethical manner towards cloud users.
There is a huge potential market for the expansion of cloud
computing from businesses, governments and individuals alike
who are put off by the lack of accountability, assurance, audit,
confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy, responsibility
and security. CSPs have a golden opportunity to seize the
initiative to radically transform the shape of cloud computing
for the better. Hence the idea of the CSP being a “partner”
with shared responsibility rather than a mere provider. This
might reflect a more constructive level of relationship.
The work undertaken by the EU could provide a useful
springboard for the rapid development of an ISO standard
on cloud SLAs. Full international agreement and mandatory
implementation would go a long way towards addressing this
problem area. However, should CSPs persist in their refusal
to address these key areas of accountability, assurance, audit,
confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy, responsibility
and security, then society as a whole will need to do something
about it. Governments are not overly keen to introduce legisla-
tion, or regulation to such a technical industry. Self regulation
would be a better approach for everyone. However, should
there be no change to the status quo in the near future, perhaps
regulators could start by forcing accountability on CSPs using
existing powers with resulting bad publicity and possibly fines
for non-compliance.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a clear need for better responsibility and account-
ability across all the actors involved in cloud ecosystems. CSPs
persist in behaving with too great a level of self-interest and
fail to accept broader responsibilities, resulting in cloud users
having to bear the burden of this inequity between the parties.
An initial step would be for the CSPs to take responsibility for
their actions by including a proper provision for accountability
in their SLAs. This will provide the basis for developing a
level playing field between all cloud users and the CSPs.
Accountability will not guarantee complete security, but
will assist in fairly sharing the risks between CSPs and cloud
users. With accountability, technical solutions which have been
developed up to now, will actually have a greater chance of
working. Clearly, acknowledgement of assurance, audit, confi-
dentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy and security in CSPs’
SLAs, and specified to meaningful levels, would be signs of
a welcome maturity of approach enabling and encouraging
further acceptance and development.
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